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Cognitive science has a longstanding interest in the ways that people acquire and
use abstract vs. concrete words (e.g., truth vs. piano). One dominant theory holds
that abstract and concrete words are subserved by two parallel semantic systems.
We recently proposed an alternative account of abstract-concrete word representation
premised upon a unitary, high dimensional semantic space wherein word meaning is
nested. We hypothesize that a range of cognitive and perceptual dimensions (e.g.,
emotion, time, space, color, size, visual form) bound this space, forming a conceptual
topography. Here we report a normative study where we examined the clustering
properties of a sample of English words (N = 750) spanning a spectrum of concreteness
in a continuous manner from highly abstract to highly concrete. Participants (N = 328)
rated each target word on a range of 14 cognitive dimensions (e.g., color, emotion,
valence, polarity, motion, space). The dimensions reduced to three factors: Endogenous
factor, Exogenous factor, and Magnitude factor. Concepts were plotted in a unified,
multimodal space with concrete and abstract concepts along a continuous continuum.
We discuss theoretical implications and practical applications of this dataset. These word
norms are freely available for download and use at http://www.reilly-coglab.com/data/.
Keywords: word concreteness effect, semantic memory, concrete-abstract, lexical-semantic, multidimensional
scaling
INTRODUCTION
Theword concreteness effect refers to a robust advantage that concrete wordsmanifest over abstract
words across numerous domains, including age-of-acquisition, spelling, reading, serial recall,
speeded naming, and word recognition (Gilhooly and Logie, 1980; Bleasdale, 1987; Schwanenflugel
et al., 1988; Walker and Hulme, 1999; Allen and Hulme, 2006). The origin of the word concreteness
effect and its instantiation within the human brain remain among the most contested questions
in cognitive neuroscience. Debate over the concreteness effect has accelerated during the past
decade, fueled by advances in functional neuroimaging, embodied approaches to modeling the role
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of emotion in abstract word representation, and computational
neuropsychological investigations contrasting the fit of different
models within patient-based dissociations (Binder et al., 2005;
Crutch andWarrington, 2005; Bonner et al., 2009; Vigliocco et al.,
2013).
The Context Availability Model (CAM) proposes the
dissociation between abstract and concrete concepts is due
to differences in verbal context (Schwanenflugel and Shoben,
1983; Schwanenflugel et al., 1988). In the CAM, verbal context
can be understood as information (supplied by discourse or
the individual’s prior knowledge) that allows for enriched
association between concepts. Increased association is postulated
to lead to a richer representation of the concept in the brain.
Concrete concepts, therefore, have a selective advantage over
abstract concepts due to greater availability of contextual
information. Stronger availability of contextual information
for concrete concepts can be illustrated by comparing a
concrete concept such as DOG with an abstract concept such
as MAGNITUDE. While associated perceptual information for
a concept such as DOG (e.g., leash, bowl) is readily available,
analogous relations for a concept such as MAGNITUDE are less
available.
Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory (DCT) has seen a lengthy and
influential tenure as a dominant model of word concreteness
(Paivio, 1991). DCT is premised upon the existence of two
parallel semantic systems. One component system is dedicated to
verbal semantics (i.e., linguistic associations), whereas the other
is dedicated to sensory-based feature knowledge (i.e., imaginal
semantics). Paivio argues that these systems (or codes) are
dissociable but also highly interactive. Concrete words have both
sensory and verbal representations and are as such dually coded.
In contrast, abstract words inherently lack sensory salience and
are, therefore, exclusively coded within the verbal semantic
system. The concreteness advantage is conferred from the dual
and redundant support of two interactive semantic systems
within the human brain.
DCT yields an explicit prediction about the effects of
neurological damage on abstract-concrete word representation.
That is, damage to the verbal semantic system should produce
catastrophic loss of abstract concepts. In contrast, concrete
concepts should show resilience to verbal semantic damage
due to their redundant representation within a sensory-based
semantic code. Conversely, selective damage to the sensory-
based semantic code should impact abstract and concrete words
uniformly, since both word types share coding within the verbal
semantic system. Thus, DCT predicts one type of patient-based
dissociation characterized by the loss of abstract words. While
a majority of studies display this dissociation (Roeltgen et al.,
1983; Coltheart et al., 1987; Katz andGoodglass, 1990;Martin and
Saffran, 1992; Franklin et al., 1995) there are a number of studies
that demonstrate the opposite dissociation (Warrington, 1975;
Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Breedin et al., 1994; Cipolotti and
Warrington, 1995; Marshall et al., 1996; Papagno et al., 2007;
Reilly et al., 2007) suggesting that the DCT may not be able
to completely characterize the representation of concrete and
abstract concepts in the brain.
Alternatives to DCT
The DCT argues that the impoverished representation of
abstract concepts has led to differences between abstract and
concrete concepts. More recently, two theories have moved
from attempting to explain the differences between abstract
and concrete concepts in a quantitative manner to a qualitative
one. Crutch and Warrington (2005), Crutch and Jackson (2011)
argue that abstract and concrete concepts differ based on their
relative reliance on association or similarity. They postulate
that abstract concepts rely more heavily on associations while
concrete concepts rely more heavily on similarity. In other words,
a concrete concept such as DOG would rely more heavily on a
similar concept such as CAT than an associated concept such as
LEASH to support the concept. On the other hand LOVE would
rely more on an associated concept such as HATE than a similar
concept such as AFFECTION.
Kousta et al. (2011) offer a theory that focuses on the role
of affective information. Weak embodiment theories often argue
that emotion may play a role in the representation of concepts
(Andrews et al., 2009). Kousta and colleagues frame their theory
similarly to DCT and argue that concrete concepts are supported
by both the verbal and sensorimotor systems. They differ in that
Kousta and colleagues argue that abstract concepts are not only
supported by verbal systems but also by affective information.
They supported this theory by revisiting concreteness effects.
(Kousta et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2013) found that when
certain psycholinguistic characteristics, such as imageability and
context availability, are controlled for, the concreteness effect
disappears and even slightly reverses. This finding, however, is
not without controversy (see Paivio, 2013).
While we now have a strong theoretical framework to
understand the qualitative and quantitative differences between
abstract and concrete concepts, it remains an open question
as to how these two types of concepts interact in one larger
semantic system.We are well able to describe their differences but
are less well-equipped to describe their similarities. Crutch and
Kousta offer weak embodiment accounts for the representation of
abstract and concrete concepts. Embodied theories hold that the
brain decomposes objects into discrete sets of features and stores
such features within a massively distributed network mirroring
perception (e.g., visual features are stored proximal to the visual
cortex; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Martin, 2007; Barsalou, 2008).
Therefore, to begin answering the question of how these concepts
interact we must first determine their features. Feature listing
approaches have been key to determining the features of concrete
concepts (Tyler et al., 2000; Garrard et al., 2001; Cree andMcRae,
2003). These approaches often involve participants being given a
concept to which they are asked to list its features. This allows for
the researcher to determine the discrete features of a concept as
well as the common features among categories of concepts. This
work has been influential in describing how concrete concepts
rely overwhelmingly on sensorimotor information. This work has
also helped inform the difference between living and non-living
concepts in their representation (Garrard et al., 2001) as well as
the primacy of color for the representation of fruit (Cree and
McRae, 2003).
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There are drawbacks, however, to this approach. While it
has shown some utility for abstract concepts (Wiemer-Hastings
and Xu, 2005), these feature listing approaches are better suited
for concrete concepts. This can be illustrated by trying to
determine the features of DRILL as opposed to the features of
MAGNITUDE. It was, therefore, necessary to invoke a method
that would allow us to determine not just the features of concrete
concepts but also abstract concepts. Crutch et al. (2012) piloted
a solution to the shortcomings of the feature listing approach
in the form of the abstract conceptual feature (ACF) rating
approach. This method involved participants rating 50 abstract
concepts on a seven point Likert scale on a variety of cognitive
dimensions.
Defining a Multi-dimensional Semantic
Space
We previously performed the ACF on 400 nouns (200 abstract
& 200 concrete; Troche et al., 2014). This involved participants
being asked to rate the 400 nouns on a seven point Likert scale for
12 separate cognitive dimensions. The 12 cognitive dimensions
were chosen due to their potential weighting in abstract concept
representation (Stuss et al., 1995; Rolls, 2000; Walsh, 2003;
Amodio and Frith, 2006; Moscovitch et al., 2006).
We performed an exploratory factor analysis on the data
and found that our 12 dimensions could be reduced to three
latent factors. These latent factors were characterized as a
perceptual salience factor, an affective association factor, and
a magnitude factor. We then wanted to determine how these
concepts would cluster across these three factors. A hierarchical
agglomerative cluster analysis revealed that while there is
considerable separation between abstract and concrete concepts,
there is also an amount of overlap.
The separation was characterized by differences in perceptual
salience. This is not a surprising finding, as by their definition
concrete concepts have a perceptual body while abstract concepts
do not. A more novel finding was the way affective associations
seemed to bind concepts. That is, as concepts increased in
affective association they also tended to group together regardless
of semantic class. For example LOVE and CHOCOLATE (high
affective concepts) were grouped together while INSTANCE and
BANANA (low affective concepts) were very far from each other.
It was also determined that the Magnitude factor was important
for more finely grained distinctions between concepts. This
finding can be understood through the concepts of HATE and
DISLIKE. While HATE and DISLIKE describe similar feelings,
their subtle differences can only truly be described through subtle
differences in the scale of these feelings.
We were able to plot the words in a three-dimensional space
bounded by the three latent dimensions we created during factor
reduction. Plotting the words in this manner allowed us to
determine the distance between the concepts using the simple
distance metric of Euclidian distance. In effect, we were able to
create a semantic space where we could determine how close or
far concepts were to each other, with distance in space indicating
the relatedness of concepts. We compared the ability of our
space to determine the relatedness of abstract concepts to that
of Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer and Dumais, 1997). We
found that our space slightly outperformed LSA (Crutch et al.,
2013), a highly validmeasure of concept relatedness (Howard and
Kahana, 1999, 2002; Zaromb et al., 2006) suggesting the validity
of the space for abstract concepts.
Refining a Multidimensional Semantic
Space
We identified several problems with the ACF that limited the
inference of our initial forays. There were not enough words, we
dichotomized concreteness rather than treating it as a continuous
variable, and we biased our dimensionality selection in favor of
abstract words. In the current paper, we attempted to improve
upon the weaknesses of the ACF to create a semantic space that
was neurologically valid for all concepts not just abstract concepts
and in this way create a method that would allow us to describe
the features of both abstract and concrete concepts in a unified
manner which would, in turn, allow us to determine not only how
concepts differ but also how they relate.
Our current approach, the conceptual feature rating approach
(CFR), followed a similar procedure to the ACF. Both approaches
asked participants to rate concepts across a variety of dimensions
on a seven point Likert scale. The CFR, however, included a
greater number of dimensions that would aid in the specificity
of the concrete space. We also increased the corpus of words
to include not only a greater number of abstract and concrete
concepts but also a number of words of middling concreteness
which were not included in our previous work. This allowed
us to create a continuous semantic space which is closer to the
true nature of concepts as opposed to the bimodal space we had
previously created.
The greatest difference between the ACF and the CFR
approach were the dimensions chosen to be included. We
kept the previous dimensions of Emotion, Polarity, Social
Interaction, Thought, Morality, Time, Space, and Quantity
but also included the dimensions of Visual Form, Auditory,




The overall polarity of concepts (i.e., positive, neutral, negative)
was considered as a possible marker of the reward system (e.g.,
Rolls, 2000) because appraisal of stimulus valence is central to
multiple goal-directed behaviors. Valence may be linked to a
range of stimulus attributes (e.g., spatial information: up vs.
down; large vs. small; emotion: good vs. bad), for example as
demonstrated in the space-valence congruence effect (Meier and
Robinson, 2004), and may be central to the representation of
antonymous semantic relationships (Crutch et al., 2012). In this
study, we frame polarity not as the level of positive vs. level
of negative emotion but the overall level of emotion regardless
of polarity. This was done due to the suggestion by Kousta
and colleagues that polarity regardless of poll matters more for
processing than whether a concept is positive or negative (Kousta
et al., 2009).
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Emotion
Emotional processing of environmental cues substantially
influences our interactions with the world around us (see Dolan
and Vuilleumier, 2003) and hence may be expected to also
shape our stored knowledge of the world and the language
we use to describe it. Some weak embodiment theories have
emphasized the contribution to abstract concepts of not only
motor and sensory information but also emotion information
(e.g., Andrews et al., 2009; Kousta et al., 2009, 2011; Newcombe
et al., 2012; see Pecher et al., 2011 for a review). Not all abstract
words are affectively loaded, but the acquisition of affectively
loaded concepts has been suggested to provide a framework for
the subsequent acquisition of non-affective concepts based on
linguistic experience alone (Meteyard et al., 2012).
Social Interaction
Social cognition (labeled as “social interaction” for study
participants) was considered because “survival depends upon
effective social functioning” (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and
such functioning is frequently mediated through verbal
communication using a largely abstract vocabulary. Relevant
previous work includes the “words as tools” (WAT) proposal that
social and linguistic information are particularly important in the
acquisition of abstract terms (Borghi et al., 2011; Scorolli et al.,
2012), and evidence suggesting the importance of introspection
for the development of such concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009).
Morality
Morality was selected as a relevant cognitive dimension in
order to capture the association between certain words (e.g.,
“courage”) and the motivation to act in accordance with certain
social or group rules. Moral behavior has been hypothesized
to reflect cognitive-emotional association complexes represented
across a prefrontal cortex-temporo-limbic network (Moll et al.,
2005), and moral concepts have been shown to be particularly
vulnerable in patients with frontotemporal dementia (Zahn et al.,
2009).
Thought
Executive function (labeled as “thought” for the study
participants) was selected in an effort to capture the demands
that many terms that have multiple meanings or senses in
different contexts may place upon skills such as planning,
selection, inhibition, executive flexibility, and strategizing
(Stuss et al., 1995). It has been suggested that abstract words
in particular rely upon computational machinery capable of
representing hypothetical physical and mental states, the binding
of entities within a structure, and the possible use of embedding
(or recursion) in such structures.
Time
Time was selected due to its role in the temporal unfolding of
event structure (Allman and Meck, 2012). Time is key to our
understanding of reality and many disorders lead to disruptions
in time judgments that then to lead to cognitive and linguistic
deficits (Matell and Meck, 2000; Meck, 2005; Coull et al., 2011).
Space
Spatial relationships have been noted to contribute to metaphor
(Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003; Lakoff and Johnson, 2008). For
many strongly embodied theories of semantic memory, spatial
relationships are key to understanding how abstract concepts
might achieve sensory grounding. Spatial metaphors are often
used to aid in our understanding of abstract concepts such as
the saying, “love is a journey” (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005, p.
470). Spatial information has also been discovered to play a role
in the way in which concepts are processed. Concepts shown
in their iconic spatial relationship (attic above basement) are
processed more quickly than concepts shown in a non-iconic
spatial relationship (basement above attic; Zwaan and Yaxley,
2003).
Quantity
Quantity was included to assess the division between non-
numerical and numerical semantics as well as count/mass
distinctions (Gathercole, 1985). The difference between the
frequency of count nouns and mass nouns are as such; count
nouns are nouns that can be modified using a numerical term
with no unit of measure required (10 dogs; 15 chairs; 30 pens).
Mass nouns cannot be modified using a numerical term unless
a unit of measure precedes the noun (10 gallons of water, 15
pounds of sand). While these distinctions seems clear cut, recent
work in the literature suggests that this distinction is not as clear
and this distinction can shift based on context (Kulkarni et al.,
2013). The distinction between these nouns has been found to
be important for the acquisition of concepts during development
and the conception of concreteness (Gordon, 1985; Chiarelli
et al., 2011; Zanini et al., 2016).
Visual Form
In humans, vision is the dominant sense for interaction with the
outside world (Rock and Victor, 1964). It is our most keen sense
and a large portion of our brains are dedicated to processing
visual information (Mishkin et al., 1983; Van Essen et al., 1992;
Drury et al., 1996). Categorization of objects often times only
requires input from this sense and feature listing approaches
confirm their role in the representation of a variety of concrete
concepts (Tyler et al., 2000; Garrard et al., 2001; Cree andMcRae,
2003).
Auditory
While vision is the most dominant and sensitive human sense,
audition remains an important domain as well. The combination
of visual and auditory information has been shown to improve
object recognition (Stein et al., 1996; Molholm et al., 2004). Also
while vision shows primacy for object recognition, audition holds
primacy for word recognition and is essential to our access to
language.
Tactile
Tactile information does not play as large a part in object
recognition as auditory and visual form, but in isolation humans
can sensitively use tactile information for object recognition
(Klatzky et al., 1987; Lederman and Klatzky, 1987). Tactile
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information has shown importance for the representation of both
tools and natural kinds (Chao andMartin, 2000; Tyler et al., 2000;
Garrard et al., 2001; Cree andMcRae, 2003). It has been suggested
that tactile processing and representation may occur in parietal
and insular association cortices (Reed et al., 2004)
Smell/Taste
The chemical senses (taste & smell) were combined in this study.
Both senses, in contrast to the visual, auditory and tactile senses,
are not represented in the unimodal neocortex but in the limbic
and paralimbic cortex (Zatorre et al., 1992; Jones-Gotman and
Zatorre, 1993; Small et al., 1999). These brain areas have been
associated with affective processing and several studies have
shown links between the chemical senses and affective states
(Small et al., 1997; Zald et al., 1998; Royet et al., 2000). Olfactory
bulb projection also extend to the hippocampus a portion of the
brain important for long term memory storage (White, 1965;
Scalia and Winans, 1975).
The inclusion of the dimensions Visual form, Auditory,
Tactile, & Smell/Taste also fit well within the framework of
the influential work by Connell and Lynott (2012; 2013). They
determined that the perceptual strength of a concept (i.e., how
much a concept is represented by the above dimensions) was
better able to predict performance on a lexical decision and word
naming task as compared to the concreteness or the imageability
of a concept.
Color
Color has been found to hold special significance for the
representation of fruits and vegetables (Cree andMcRae, 2003). It
has also been noted, however, that color can aid in the recognition
of a variety of objects (Ostergaard and Davidoff, 1985; Wurm
et al., 1993; Tanaka and Presnell, 1999). Color is believed to be
represented in inferior temporal and posterior parietal cortices
(Chao and Martin, 1999).
Self-Generated Motion
Self-Generated Motion has been strongly indicated in the
representation of tools (Chao and Martin, 1999; Crutch and
Warrington, 2003; Hauk et al., 2004). As with the perceptual
features of a concept, the self-generated movements of a tool are
acquired through mental simulation. A variety of studies have
indicated that the motor cortex plays a role in the representation
of action concepts and tools. It has been further shown that
concepts show a somatotopic organization in their representation
(Farah andMcClelland, 1991; Chao andMartin, 2000; Crutch and
Warrington, 2003; McRae et al., 2005). In other words, concepts
like pencil and hammer would show greater representation in
the hand area of the motor cortex while concepts like kick and
walk would show greater representation in leg area of the motor
cortex.
It should be noted that while we expanded the list of
dimensions from our previous work this list of dimensions is
by no means exhaustive. Many of these dimensions could be
further broken down into a larger set of dimensions. For instance
emotion could be broken down further into dominance, valence,
and arousal or motion to arm motion and leg motion. We
wanted, however, to take care to not overparamitize our model
and therefore erred on the side of more coarse dimensions as
compared to an exhaustive list of every detailed dimensions.
We determined that participants might not appreciate the subtle
differences between an exhaustive list which would reduce the
uniqueness of each dimension for the model.
METHODS
Participants
Participants (N = 328) were recruited through the online
crowd-sourcing program Mechanical Turk. Recent validation
studies have shown that the Mechanical Turk data show
comparable reliability to standard survey metrics, independent
of the task or the amount of payment (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
The Mechanical Turk allows users to set specific participant
parameters. We isolated participants from the United States who
were by self-report native English speakers. Mean age was 34.63
years (range 18–77; SD = 6.45); mean education was 15.03
years (range = 11–20; SD = 1.78). We obtained 328 complete
surveys, 173 of which were completed by females. Participants
were compensated $6 for∼45min of work.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli (N = 750) included English nouns drawn from the
Medical Research Council (MRC) Psycholinguistic Database
(Coltheart, 1981). We eliminated archaic entries and derivatives
of other words in the corpus (e.g., bed vs. bedroom). Stimuli
were both frequent and familiar as confirmed by the Subtlex
American Word Frequency norms (Brysbaert and New, 2009)
and the MRC familiarity norms (Coltheart, 1981). Average word
frequency was 50.7 per-million words (SD = 160.97, range =
0.02–2759.2). Average word familiarity was 526 on a 100–700
point scale (SD= 55, range= 334–646).
Our aim was to obtain a diverse sample of words varied in
concreteness from highly abstract to highly concrete, including
a neutral subset of stimuli. The MRC Psycholinguistic database
word concreteness ratings reflect an amalgamation of three
smaller datasets (Paivio et al., 1968; Toglia and Battig, 1978;
Gilhooly and Logie, 1980). These datasets were subsequently
rescaled to a common 100–700 metric with a mean of 438
and a standard deviation of 120. We sampled a continuous
spectrum of concreteness, ranging from highly abstract words
(e.g., assumption) to highly concrete (e.g., tomato). A key aspect
of this sampling procedure is that we also included words in
the middling range concreteness (e.g., damage). One significant
advantage of this sampling procedure is that it treats concreteness
as a continuous, rather than dichotomous variable.
Cognitive Dimensions and Scale
Instructions
The 750 words were rated across 14 cognitive dimensions by
participants. Participants signaled their rating for each word via
mouse click in a horizontally arrayed series of survey bubbles,
corresponding to a seven-point Likert Scale. This scale ranged
from Strongly Disagree (1), through Neutral (4), to Strongly
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Agree (7). The specific wording we used for rating each cognitive
dimension was as follows:
Polarity “I relate this word to positive or negative feelings in
myself.”
Thought “I relate this word to mental activity, ideas, opinions,
and judgments.”
Emotion “I relate this word with human emotion.”
Social Interaction “I relate this word with relationships
between people.”
Time “I relate this word with time, order, or duration.”
Space “I relate this word to position, place or direction.”
Quantity “I relate this word to size, amount or scope.”
Morality “I relate this word to morality, rules or any other
thing that governs my behavior”
Visual form “I relate this word to shapes, forms, textures that I
can see with my eyes.”
Tactile “ I relate this word to sensations (e.g., texture, shape,
temperature, wetness) I can feel with my hands or body.”
Smell/Taste “I relate this word to flavors and odors I can smell
and/or taste.”
Auditory “I relate this word to sounds, rhythms, etc. that I can
hear.”
Color “I relate this word to color.”
Self-Motion “I relate this word to my own self-generated
movement.”
Participants were instructed to use the entire scale and to work
quickly but carefully. The order of presentation both between and
within the cognitive dimensions was fully randomized.
Data Analysis Procedures
We first pursued dimension reduction via factor analysis with
a Varimax Rotation and Kaiser Normalization (Kaiser, 1958)
using SPSS-21. We extracted factors with Eigenvalues >1 and
generated orthogonalized factor scores using the Anderson and
Rubin (1956) method. We then submitted the factor scores
for each word (N = 750) to a hierarchical agglomerative
cluster analysis. This clustering algorithm involves a bottom-up
approach, aggregating clusters upward until attaining a stopping
point. We used Ward’s method of clustering (Ward, 1963)
and determined the optimal clustering solution by comparing
partitional k-means solutions using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic as
per the method proposed by Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984).
RESULTS
Inter-rater Reliability
We determined the inter-rater reliability of each dimension
by examining the two-way mixed intraclass correlation (ICC).
All dimensions had excellent inter-rater reliabilities (Table 1)
according to Cicchetti’s (1994) guidelines.
Attributes of the Individual Predictors Prior
to Clustering
Figure 1 represents scatterplots of the original 14 cognitive
dimensions reflecting salience of each domain (x-axis) relative
to its respective Likert scale rating (y-axis). Figure 2 represents a

















correlation matrix describing bivariate correlations between each
of the individual predictors and factor scores with the Perceptual
Strength Norms (Lynott and Connell, 2013) and the Affective
Rating Norms (Warriner et al., 2013).
Factor Analysis
Using an Eigenvector >1 extraction criterion, SPSS-21 extracted
three latent factors from the original 14 dimensions. Table 2
reflects the component matrix.
Factors aggregated as follows:
• Factor 1 (Endogenous): Emotion, Polarity, Social Interaction,
Morality, Motion Self-Generated, Thought
• Factor 2 (Exogenous): Color, Olfactory/Gustatory, Tactile,
Visual Form, Auditory
• Factor 3 (Exogenous): Space, Quantity, Time
We plotted the factor scores in order to create a visual
representation of the semantic space. We created a three-
dimensional scatterplot of the space along with two-dimensional
scatterplots as it can be difficult to determine patterns in a three
dimensional plan. We created two versions of each plot, one set
of plots was colored based on the concreteness of the concepts
(Figures 3–6) and the other was based on the cluster membership
which is described below (Figures 7–10).
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
We evaluated various cluster sizes using Cohen’s Kappa, and a
16-cluster solution (Kappa = 0.89) best fit the data. We then
conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis, starting with 16 clusters,
agglomerating upward through six distinct levels until achieving
convergence. Figure 11 is a visual representation of our cluster
analysis which also illustrates the concreteness of the nouns
inside of the cluster. Table 3 reflects the mean dimension rating
for the nouns inside of the clusters.
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplots of word concreteness by dimension with fit line included. The x-axis represents the concreteness of the concept while the y-axis represents
the mean likert score of each concept for each domain. Curves were fitted using the Loess Method as implemented within the R statistical base package. Mot-Self,
Self-Generated Motion; Social, Social Interaction; Vis-Form, Visual Form.
DISCUSSION
In this experiment we applied the Conceptual Feature Rating
(CFR) approach as a method to describe the features of both
abstract and concrete concepts in a unified space. We improved
upon our initial method by not only including dimensions from
our previous work but also by expanding our approach to other
dimensions suggested by feature listing approaches and the work
on perceptual strength by Connel and Lyott (Connell and Lynott,
2012; Lynott and Connell, 2013) as holding significance for the
representation of concrete concepts. We also included concepts
from across the whole concreteness spectrum not just those at
the extremes of the spectrum.
Factor Analysis
As with our previous work, the dimensions reduced to three
latent variables. These three variables, however, had some
nuanced differences. In our previous work, we described the
latent variables as encompassing a sensorimotor variable,
a social/affective information variable, and a magnitude
variable. In this work the three latent variables represented an
Endogenous variable, an Exogenous variable, and a Magnitude
variable. The Endogenous variable contained the dimensions of
Emotion, Polarity, Social Interaction, Morality, Self-Generated
Motion, and Thought. The Exogenous variable contained
the dimensions of Color, Olfactory/Gustatory, Tactile, Visual
Form, and Auditory. Finally the Magnitude variable contained
Space, Quantity, Time. Overall the Exogenous and Endogenous
variables were similar to the variables in our previous work.
The Magnitude variable had a slight difference in this study
as compared to our previous work. The factor reduction for
our ACF space reduced the dimensions of Space and Quantity
into one latent variable which we classified as Magnitude while
the Time dimension reduced into what we are describing in
this study as the Exogenous variable. For our current factor
reduction, not only Space and Quantity reduced into a latent
variable but Time as well. We mused in our other work why
Time had not reduced with Space and Quantity and the current
reduction is more in line with what Walsh (2003) described as a
magnitude system. These two findings, however, and mixed and
likely require further study.
The Endogenous variable contained, as with our social/
affective information variable from our past work, the
dimensions of Emotion, Polarity, Morality, Thought, Social
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FIGURE 2 | Correlations between dimensions, factor scores, Wariner et al. norms, and Connell & Lynott norms. Social, Social Interaction; MotSelf, Self-Generated
Motion; TasSmell, Taste/Smell; VisForm, Visual Form; Dom, Dominance; AudStren, Auditory Strength; GusStren; Gustatory Strength; HapStren; Hapatic Strength;
OlfStren, Olfactory Strength; VisStren, Visual Strength; MaxStren, Maximum Perceptual Strength (maximum modality strength rating).
Interaction. It also contained, however, the dimension of Self-
Generated Motion. This dimension was not present during
the ACF analyses. The fact that this dimension reduced with
these other dimensions lead us to conclude that this variable
may be more than just a variable of social/affective information.
This variable may be more indicative of a difference between
information which arises from the Self vs. information which
arises from the outside (Endogenous vs. Exogenous).
Correlation
Figure 2 presents both the uniqueness of our findings but
also its relation to previous work. This figure is a bivariate
correlation matrix of our dimension and factor scores with
the Perceptual Strength Norms (Lynott and Connell, 2013)
and Affective Rating Norms (Warriner et al., 2013). A closer
examination of the correlations between the factor scores with
these norms reveals several interesting findings. Factor 1 our
Endogenous variable has significant correlations with Arousal
(0.31) and Auditory Strength (0.48). Factor 2 the Exogenous
variable has strong correlations with many of the perceptual
strength measures (Haptic Strength = 0.39; Olfactory Strength
= 0.43; Visual Strength= 0.44; Max Perceptual Strength= 0.53).
Factor 3 theMagnitude variable displayed significant correlations
with Valence (0.41) and Dominance (0.29) suggesting that the
Magnitude variable does indeed play a role in teasing apart the
subtle differences across affective concepts.
Cluster Analysis
Our cluster analysis revealed both an improvement in our
overall method from our previous work but also some
important theoretical findings. Through the inclusion of greater
dimensionality, we were able to improve the specificity of our
space for concrete concepts. Figure 11 is a visualization of
our hierarchical cluster analysis. The left side of the cluster
analysis (C1–C4) contains mostly concrete concepts. In our ACF
approach concrete concepts clustered into large undifferentiated
clusters. In this approach concrete concepts grouped across four
smaller clusters which were differentiated across categories such
as landscapes (e.g., FOREST, LAKE, VOLCANO; C1), natural
kinds (CATTERPILLER, LIZARD, PIGEON; C2) and tools (e.g.,
KNIFE, CUP, LAMP; C3). Overall these findings display that this
approach can be used to specify the features of both abstract and
concrete concepts with a common method.
Further inspection of the cluster analysis revealed trends that
were similar to those seen in the semantic space created by the
ACF. Globally, abstract and concrete concepts split. Concrete
concepts were more dominant on one side of the cluster analysis
while abstract concepts were more dominant on the opposite
side. It should also be noted that concrete concepts had higher
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TABLE 2 | Component matrix.
Principal component















Exogenous variable ratings while abstract concepts had higher
Endogenous variable ratings overall.
A closer inspection revealed, as with previous work, that
the Endogenous variable had the ability to draw concepts high
in the Exogenous variable toward the right side of the cluster
analysis (see Figures 7–10). In other words, concepts like DAD
and BABY (C13), even though firmly concrete, were considered
related to concepts like LOVE and TRUST (C14). These findings
fit well with the assertions of other researchers that Endogenous
information such as Emotion, Polarity, Social Interaction can
change the representation of a concept, even a concrete concept
(Altarriba et al., 1999; Andrews et al., 2009; Kousta et al., 2011).
The Magnitude variable had similar effects on the clustering
of concepts as in the ACF. The magnitude variable, while not
leading to great shifts in the clustering of concepts as with the
Endogenous and Exogenous variable, did play a key role in
the fine-grained discrimination of concepts. We have previously
argued that a Magnitude system is necessary in the semantic
system in order to differentiate between concepts such as HATE
and DISLIKE. It also was important in characterizing the
differences between concepts of distance (e.g., MILEAGE, INCH,
LENGTH; C7) and other abstract scientific conceptualizations
(e.g., CONCLUSION, CALCULATION, DISTRIBUTION; C6).
We also observed that even though polarity (at least not
as described by Bradley and Lang) and dominance were not
directly measured, items did cluster across these variables.
Positive emotions such as LOVE, FREEDOM, and HOPE (C14)
clustered separately from Negative emotions such as GRIEF,
SADNESS, andMISERY (C16). Concepts low in dominance such
as HELPLESSNESS, FEAR, and GUILT (C9) clustered as well.
Implications
These findings have interesting implications for how we
understand the relationship between abstract and concrete
concepts. Our CFR space not only allows us to describe the
FIGURE 3 | Three-dimensional semantic space with the color of the dots
representing concreteness. Redder colors represent more concrete concepts
while bluer colors represent more abstract concepts. The x, y, and z-axis
represent the endogenous, exogenous, and magnitude scores respectively of
each concept.
FIGURE 4 | Two-dimensional scatterplot of semantic space with the color of
the dots representing concreteness. Redder colors represent more concrete
concepts while bluer colors represent more abstract concepts. The x, y-axis
represent the endogenous & exogenous scores respectively of each concept.
features of just abstract and just concrete concepts but also to
describe the relationship between abstract and concrete concepts.
By offering a unimodal, multidimensional semantic space, we are
able to describe concepts in a more naturalistic manner.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1787
Troche et al. Conceptual Topography
FIGURE 5 | Two-dimensional scatterplot of semantic space with the color of
the dots representing concreteness. Redder colors represent more concrete
concepts while bluer colors represent more abstract concepts. The x, y-axis
represent the endogenous & magnitude scores respectively of each concept.
FIGURE 6 | Two-dimensional scatterplot of semantic space with the color of
the dots representing concreteness. Redder colors represent more concrete
concepts while bluer colors represent more abstract concepts. The x, y-axis
represent the exogenous & magnitude scores respectively of each concept.
There remains much controversy on the nature of
concreteness in the literature. A large body of work suggests
that abstract and concrete concepts are separate and unique
FIGURE 7 | Three-dimensional semantic space with the color of the dots
representing cluster membership. Each individual color represents a separate
cluster from the cluster analysis. The x, y, and z-axis represent the
endogenous, exogenous, and magnitude scores respectively of each concept.
FIGURE 8 | Two-dimensional semantic space with the color of the dots
representing cluster membership. Each individual color represents a separate
cluster from the cluster analysis. The x, y-axis represent the endogenous &
exogenous scores respectively of each concept.
entities with a bimodal distribution (Brysbaert et al., 2014).
There is a growing body of literature, however, that argues
that concreteness is a continuous spectrum (Kousta et al.,
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FIGURE 9 | Two-dimensional semantic space with the color of the dots
representing cluster membership. Each individual color represents a separate
cluster from the cluster analysis. The x, y-axis represent the endogenous &
magnitude scores respectively of each concept.
2009, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2013). This work suggests that
abstract and concrete concepts can be modeled on a continuous
spectrum and that a multimodal approach can not only describe
the similarities but the differences between the concepts.
Inspection of the three dimensional semantic space does
reveal that concepts position in space is highly influence
by sensory states (i.e., how imageable a concept is), but it
also reveals that this difference is graded, not bimodally as
seen in some portions of the literature. The inclusion of
endogenous information such as emotion and the magnitude
information led to a continuous and graded spread of the
concepts. It reveals that while the concreteness of a concept
is important for its representation, endogenous information
and magnitude information also play an important role in
the way a concept is represented. We see that endogenous
information can bind concepts regardless of their concreteness
which affirms more recent work on the relationship between
emotion and concreteness (Kousta et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al.,
2013). We also see, more novelly, that magnitude information
can play an important role in the separation of concepts
at the microlevel (i.e., HATE vs. DISLIKE). It should be
noted that this work in no way denies the importance of the
abstract and concrete distinction. What we argue is that the
distinction plays an important part in the representation of
concepts along with endogenous information and magnitude
information and that these factors can be modeled in a unified,
multidimensional space creating a continuous concreteness
spectrum.
FIGURE 10 | Two-dimensional semantic space with the color of the dots
representing cluster membership. Each individual color represents a separate
cluster from the cluster analysis. The x, y-axis represent the exogenous &
magnitude scores respectively of each concept.
Validity
The stability of these results across this study and our previous
study were a strong indication of the validity of this approach,
but we have also begun to test the validity of this space using
formal behavioral testing. As previously discussed Crutch and
colleagues have determined that abstract and concrete concepts
rely differentially on similarity or associative information. Garcia
et al. (2015) found that the concepts in the CFR space were
able to model the similarity and association differences between
concepts effectively.
The ability to model both similarity and association may
have been a factor in why the CFR model outperformed Latent
Semantic Analysis (Landauer and Dumais, 1997) at determining
the relatedness between concepts in a word relatedness task. A
triad of words was shown to participants in which they had to
determine which of the bottom two words most matched the
top word (Troche and Reilly, 2016). In these tasks, the more
related the target and probe are the more quickly, and easily the
relationship is discovered. Items that were highly related in the
CFR space as compared to the LSA space were found to be more
quickly and easily processed. These findings, due to the validity
of the LSA space, are a strong indication of the validity of both
CFR space and the method used to create the space.
Future Directions
Since our initial foray into feature rating approaches (Crutch
et al., 2012; Troche et al., 2014) several other researchers have
used similar methods with great success. These methods are
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FIGURE 11 | Hierarchical cluster analysis with cluster numbers. Color of the cluster is representative of the concreteness of the words inside of the cluster.
TABLE 3 | Clustering properties for the 750 english target words.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16
Polarity 3.9 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.1 4.5 5.2 4.2 4.5
Smell-Taste 4.2 4.7 3.0 3.2 2.4 1.7 1.7 2.4 1.8 1.6 2.2 2.7 3.2 1.8 1.8 1.7
Visual Form 5.4 6.0 5.8 5.7 4.3 2.4 2.7 3.7 2.5 2.0 3.7 2.9 4.7 2.1 1.9 2.0
Tactile 4.1 4.7 4.3 4.3 2.8 1.8 1.9 2.7 1.9 1.7 2.5 2.1 3.6 2.0 1.9 1.9
Auditory 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.2 2.3 1.9 1.6 2.5 2.6 2.0 3.2 3.1 4.1 2.4 2.1 2.6
Color 4.2 4.5 3.3 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.2 2.0 2.2
MotionSelf 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.2 3.2 2.9 4.3 3.6 4.0
Morality 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.7 3.6 3.5 2.5 3.2 2.9 4.8 4.0 4.2
Emotion 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.5 2.9 3.6 4.7 3.9 5.0
Space 4.6 2.8 2.6 3.5 3.9 3.5 4.1 4.6 2.5 2.8 3.1 4.4 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.1
Quantity 3.9 2.7 2.6 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.9 4.5 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.1 2.9 4.0 3.7 3.2
Social 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.5 3.7 3.2 2.9 3.3 4.2 4.3 3.8 4.2
Time 2.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 3.2 4.2 4.8 4.1 2.7 3.5 2.9 3.9 3.0 3.9 3.8 3.3
Thought 2.2 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.6 3.6 2.7 2.9 4.1 4.1 3.0 4.2 3.4 5.4 4.7 5.1
Dimension mean for the words encapsulated in each cluster.
employed as they can be employed successfully to describe the
semantic representation of both abstract and concrete concepts
as we have successfully shown in our current work.Most recently,
Binder and colleagues performed a feature rating approach
with over 65 dimensions (Binder et al., 2016). They also were
successful in using a feature rating approach to describe not only
the representation of concrete concepts but abstract concepts
as well.
The interesting work by Binder has added a key piece
to our understanding of the normal functioning of the
semantic system. We, however, remain interested in how the
semantic space might change due to age or neurological disease
(e.g., Parkinson’s Disease, Corticobasal Degeneration, Semantic
Dementia). Having older adults and persons with neurological
disease perform a feature rating approach would be an excellent
method for describing these differences. In this case, our CFR
approach would likely be best with these groups due to the
inherent difficulties in recruitment and limitations in time
associated with them. Also with enough normative data with
these groups, this approach could become a sensitive screening
measure for neurological disease. We know that a variety of
neurological disorders affect the semantic system differently.
Therefore, the patterns in response might become an early
indicator of a certain neurological disease. This would also bring
us closer to an evaluation tool for abstract concept loss for which
few options exist.
Another important question that remains unanswered specific
to the CFR space is how our space would map onto the brain
space. It would appear to map well onto the brain space with each
of the three factors being part of high level cognitive networks.
Our work, however, cannot speak to the relationship between
these brain areas and our latent factors. A study which invokes
the use of functional connectivity analyses would be required in
order to describe the highly distributed networks of these high
level cognitive processes.
If the CFR space does map onto the brain, then our CFR space
could become a powerful computational model that would allow
us to understand the way that concepts interact when certain
brain areas are damaged. For example, Corticobasal degeneration
(CBD) is a disorder which leads to lesioning of the parietal lobe
with accompanying magnitude system deficits. This would be
akin to lesioning a portion of the magnitude axis in of CFR
space. By using the CFR space in this way, we would be able to
understand better deficits in concept knowledge in a variety of
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disorders which would have huge implications for the assessment
and treatment of conceptual knowledge.
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